INSTITUTIONALISING GOVERNANCE EVIDENCE: EXPERIENCES OF THINK TANKS IN THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

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INTRODUCTION

The key documents originally laying out the mechanics of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – the continent's premier home-grown governance assessment and monitoring tool – are silent on the role of research institutes.[ii] As originally conceived, writing an APR Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) – the internal national review of governance – would entail the participating government distributing the APR Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) to enough national stakeholders, and then collecting and collating their responses, an approach largely adopted by Rwanda and Mauritius.

But when other early 'pioneer' countries – particularly Ghana and Kenya – began to plan the compilation of their CSARs, they quickly recognised the technical expertise, analytical skills and credibility that their local African research institutes could provide. These countries each contracted four think tanks to compile one of the four sections or 'thematic areas' of the CSAR, namely: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development. Following a model developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in its African Governance Reports, the think tanks created a four-pronged research process: desk research, expert interviews, household opinion surveys and focus group discussions. Most other APRM countries – apart from Rwanda and the initial stages of the Mauritian and South African peer review processes – have used similar methods.

That the use of research organisations is becoming institutionalised is illustrated by the 2007 'Supplementary Guidelines' on the APRM that recognise the role of 'technical research institutes' (TRIs). The extract below however still only provides minimal guidance:[iii]

> **Technical Research Institutions:** These are the institutions that assume the responsibility of executing the APRM Questionnaire. They should be well-known for their competence and technical capabilities to conduct sound and objective research in the four APRM thematic areas. The TRIs will be collating data, analysing and presenting the views of the general population. The research methodology should therefore rely on multi-method approach (*sic*) (qualitative and quantitative) to ensure comprehensive data collection. The final output should undergo validation to ensure that the report is representative of the public views. The TRIs are appointed by the NGC and report directly to it. A contractual agreement protecting the intellectual property of the self assessment should be signed. The NGC has to protect the confidentiality of the self-assessment process so as not to prejudice or pre-empt the ensuing stages of deliberation of the report by the Panel and Forum.

As the peer review process has rolled out across the continent, other research institutes – not only the handful contracted to help write the CSAR – have made contributions as members of civil society, by submitting their research and arguments to national and continental institutions, analysing the process and its outcomes, and acting as watchdogs to monitor implementation. They have developed comparative analyses across countries, explored common issues unearthed by the process, and some have helped mobilise other actors within civil society to take the reviews seriously and engage. Although they are not the major focus of this paper, which concentrates on the TRIs, they are an important component of the system, and are often able to operate with more freedom to advance their own evidence-based governance arguments than those contractually engaged officially by governments to write the CSAR.

Collectively, think tanks have added tremendous value to the APR process at national level, amid many challenges. There has been virtually no guidance or training from the continental APRM Secretariat, too few opportunities for peer learning from counterparts and too much 're-inventing the wheel' apart from initiatives taken by the think tanks themselves. Although the Ghana-Kenya model is congealing informally, there is not yet a universally prescribed methodology. Think tanks have faced government departments and agencies reluctant to provide information. National institutional memory has been difficult to tap into as there is poor record keeping.

Usually working under extreme time pressure and with severe resource constraints, TRIs have generally produced technical reports of high quality, based on solid evidence and cogent argument. They have interpreted the complex, confusing and convoluted questionnaire that is meant to guide the self-assessment, and gone beyond its obvious limitations. They have worked with their statistics offices to roll out national governance opinion surveys. With their contributions often unacknowledged, they have brought rigour and candour to the analysis of the state of governance in their countries. They have drawn on the knowledge of other local experts, and managed to mobilise and involve (at lease some sections) of organised civil society. Their reputation for objectivity, integrity and expertise has, in most instances, managed to convince skeptical citizens that the APRM is not just another government project designed to celebrate mediocrity and whitewash inadequacies. They have faced the multiple challenges of balancing technical and popular inputs, objectivity and subjectivity, government and civil society perspectives. And they have had to navigate choppy political waters with their governments and national governing councils (NGCs), (the multi-stakeholder 'board of directors' meant to drive the process) and various interest groups, to maintain their own intellectual integrity.

In addition, the onerous nature of the work, employment attrition, the seemingly never-ending nature of the process and the time between reviews (no country has yet embarked on its second review process) will cause some think tanks not to choose this work in future, a serious threat to institutional memory and capacity building efforts.

The fourfold framework developed by the Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) Group of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to understand the role of think tanks in evidence-based policy research is useful to reflect on when analysing the work of APRM think tanks.[iv] Its dimensions of:

(i)   the level of technical expertise required;

(ii)   the extent to which policy is contested;

(iii)   the strength of economic interested involved;

(iv)   the level of internationalisation of the policy issue are relevant and are touched on in the analysis.

While it is dangerous to generalise, some patterns have emerged. In brief, context always matters, and the degree of openness by the ruling regime and the society as a whole to the peer review process is critical. The highly technical nature of many parts of the APRM questionnaire necessitates the heavy involvement of expert national researchers. Where policy is contested – on such issues as corruption and crime levels, the validity of national statistics or the ideological basis of development policies – there tends to be pressure on think tanks to finesse their analysis so as not to upset the government that is paying their fees. When strong interests clash, there tends to be more controversy in the process, more difficulty reaching consensus, and more struggle within the system. This contestation can strengthen the process when it demands greater accountability, transparency and justification for decisions, although this is seldom recognised at the time. Finally, the APRM process has dimensions that are national, continental and international, and these realms constantly interact with each other. At best, this creates positive peer pressure for reform, but it can also retard reform as political considerations intervene.

Drawing on SAIIA's own experience as a 'technical support agency' for economic governance and management in the South African APR process in 2006 and interviews, papers and experiences of think tanks in pioneer countries and those in the second wave, this paper will attempt to:

1.   Describe and map the variety of research institutions that have been engaged as TRIs in the various APRM countries;

2.   Draw on their experiences of involvement in their national APRM processes and analyse their roles in developing evidence-based governance research;

3.   Analyse the challenges that they have faced, both practical and political; and

4. Explore ways to develop more synergy and partnerships within and across countries and regions and suggest improvements in the process, with respect to access to information and evidence management, while ensuring that the APR retains its African-owned and African-driven nature.

1. THINK TANKS IN THE APRM PROCESS

The example of Ghana illustrates why governments turned to research bodies for assistance. When Ghana – which volunteered in November 2002 to be one of the first countries to implement the peer review process – began planning how it would compile its CSAR, officials quickly realised that they would need to build trust among a skeptical population and active civil society. One method was to rely on credible and competent local research institutions to tackle the technical demands of the APRM's Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ). Ghana also recognised the political pitfalls of peer review, and the need to have both a process and a product demonstrably non-partisan and fair, that adequately included the diverse perspectives of all national stakeholders and interest groups. As Francis Appiah, Executive Secretary of Ghana's National APRM Governing Council (NAPRM-GC) put it in an interview for SAIIA's 2008 book *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers* (hereafter referred to as the 'APRM Pioneers Book'):[v]

> When we designed the APR process in Ghana, for it to be civil society driven, it would be a contradiction to use government machinery to do the job. We wanted research institutions that were locally reputable, internationally recognised and had a solid track record.

Ghanaian NGC Member Professor SKB Asante added: [vi]

> When we got the Questionnaire from [the APRM Secretariat in] South Africa, we knew we would need help. We knew the reputable institutions, and that they would do a good job. We went to see them, and engaged them.

Ghana faced some criticism from other local think tanks that the four that were hand-picked without a transparent, competitive bidding process, were not necessarily the only or the obvious choices, and that they had an ideological leaning towards the incumbent regime.[vii] In the Country Review Report of Ghana, the role of their TRIs is acknowledged and lauded:[viii]

> Ghana is leading by example in the process … the Technical Review Teams chosen to undertake the exercise were credible and competent research institutions, renowned both nationally and internationally. The Mission notes with great appreciation the high quality of the reports prepared by the four technical advisory teams.

Annex 1 below lists the research bodies contracted in selected early APRM countries to work on the four thematic areas of the SAQ. Some states have many potential TRIs, others very few. Some were hand-picked, others had to tender. In most instances, NGCs have contracted independent public policy think tanks; in others, university departments, government-funded research bodies or private consultants have been employed, as well as national statistics bureaus to execute the mass opinion survey. It is also important to note that in some cases – like Ghana, Lesotho and Algeria – the TRIs were empowered to subcontract sections of the research to other experts, thus widening the pool of professional researchers. On the whole, these are all respected, professional and experienced research institutions.

2. ANALYSING APRM THINK TANK EXPERIENCES IN DEVELOPING EVIDENCE-BASED GOVERNANCE RESEARCH

Virtually no direction is given in APRM guidelines on how to compile the CSAR, apart from the general need to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods, and engage in consultation. Countries were therefore left to invent their own methods. TRIs in two of the pioneer countries – the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Kenya's African Centre for Economic Growth (ACEG) – had recent valuable experience working on the UNECA's African

Governance Report, and in both cases adopted and adapted its four-pronged research methodology of desk research, expert interviews, national opinion surveys and focus group discussions. This debt to the ECA is confirmed by former relations and communications officer at the NEPAD Kenya Secretariat Muratha Kinuthia:[ix]

> [Our] methodology borrowed heavily from the methodology used in preparation of UNECA's African Governance Report … We chose this because Kenya sought to have a methodology that would produce scientifically sound data without making the process any less consultative. In addition, we also felt that weaknesses of one instrument could be mitigated by the other three. Data gathered by one could be validated against the rest … ACEG had at that time just executed for UNECA a survey very similar to the APRM.

Two key factors impact on the roles and experiences of TRIs in different contexts: the unwieldy SAQ; and the attitude of the government and NGC towards the research process and the institutes chosen to undertake it (trust and politics).

2.1 The Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ)

In addition to consulting with citizens, assisting with APRM publicity and designing a draft Programme of Action (POA), the TRIs' main task has been to answer the questions in one of the four thematic areas of the SAQ, in order to compile a technical report that will form a section or chapter of the CSAR. Chapter 4 of the APRM Pioneers Book outlines the implications for researchers posed by this complex 88-page questionnaire, which has 25 objectives, 58 questions and 183 indicators. One implication is the difficulties faced by TRIs in developing a consolidated and coherent analysis due to the splitting of research *between* several (usually four) TRIs, especially with subject matter – notably corruption and gender – peppered throughout the questionnaire. TRIs also have struggled with the breadth of knowledge required *within* each thematic area[x]. The suggested hierarchy of the four-tiered structure of themes, objectives, questions and indicators was unhelpful and confusing. Value-laden questions, inconsistent question format, and multiple ideas asked in single questions often posed methodological difficulties for TRIs. Confusing question numbering system and subjects omitted or underplayed (such as criminal justice, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), constitutional democracy, local government and media freedom) were further challenges TRIs had to confront.

In order to develop solid evidence-based governance research, TRIs have first had to absorb and interpret the SAQ, adapt it to local circumstances and compensate for its shortcomings. Dr Peter Quartey of ISSER in Ghana illustrates some of the challenges that the SAQ posed:[xi]

> The SAQ was adapted and simplified without losing the content of the questionnaire. The open-ended questions were minimised to allow for easy scientific analysis. The problem with the SAQ is that some of the issues were cross-cutting in the four thematic areas of governance, but this was resolved by the TRIs among themselves. Besides, there were some issues of importance to the country (science and technology, environment etc) but were not captured in the SAQ.

Because the APRM is also required to be a participatory process, TRIs have faced the challenge of how to capture the voices of the people in the report, which has meant adapting the SAQ into survey instruments suitable for both ordinary citizens and experts. This also held the advantage that the TRIs increased ownership of the research, as Professor Wafula Masai of ACEG in Kenya noted:[xii]

> Collectively, the research institutions found strength in that they jointly participated in domesticating the study instruments, and thus were able to set limits in certain overlapping areas. Individually, the institutions had a lot of strengths in their respective pillars [or thematic areas], as they had rich experience in past research.

2.1 Trust and Politics

The APRM requires frank acknowledgement of shortcomings for it to be effective – often a big task for incumbent regimes. The relationship between government and civil society (including TRIs) affects the research process. Where there has been a high level of trust built or maintained– as in Ghana and Kenya – there has been a high degree of analytical rigour and autonomy granted to the TRIs to analyse the governance situation objectively, without political influence or interference. Where this trust is absent, and there is antipathy between government and researchers, as in South Africa, a very different pattern can emerge.[xiii]

The South African Government initially refused to use research bodies, preferring to rely on submissions from the public, national consultations, and input from government departments. Eventually public outcry and the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons pressured the South African government to involve think tanks to enhance the objectivity and credibility of the process. But by the time the four research institutes had successfully tendered and been awarded the contracts in February 2006, five months into the timeline, their role was to compile written submissions into technical reports rather than conduct any desk research, surveys of citizens or experts, or focus group discussion. This left significant gaps in the technical reports, with no time allocated for correction. And after the draft CSAR was publicly validated, government proceeded to thoroughly rewrite the text, often downplaying key issues or excising language critical of current policy.[xiv] Throughout, there was contention about sources and use of statistics, particularly when they suggested government failures, with government challenging sources in submissions, technical reports, the draft CSAR, and the Country Review Report.

Finally, there is the issue of independence. Governance analysis by TRIs is not an end in itself; their technical reports will feed into the CSAR, and will inevitably be summarised, edited and altered. TRIs are contracted researchers, paid by the NGC to provide technical assistance. Being a client of government in some instances inhibits their independence and objectivity, and may compromise their ability to be critical or honest, especially if they do other work for government.[xv]

3. PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

SAIIA developed the acronym 'copper' as shorthand for what a meaningful and solid APRM process would be: **c**andid, **o**pen, **p**lanned, **p**articipatory, **e**xemplary and **r**obust. Here are key constraints that think tanks have faced in achieving these criteria.

Lack of guidance. With no training from the continental Secretariat and scant guidelines, TRIs have had to develop their own research methods and process. While this flexibility promotes innovation and allows for countries with resource constraints, it places unneeded pressure on already overburdened researchers. The pioneer countries have learned many lessons; these should inform more detailed guidelines for current and future APRM research institutions, with more peer learning between researchers.

Time pressure. Initially, it was thought that a CSAR would take 6-9 months to complete; this timeframe – enshrined in the rules – has proven unattainable, and combined with pressure from the continental Secretariat to show results, has made countries rush the research. The questionnaire is not user-friendly and takes time to modify, convert into survey instruments, and translate into local languages, The most extreme case was South Africa, where four 'Technical Support Agencies' (TSAs) were appointed in mid-February 2006, five months after the official launch of the process, and then were initially given just three weeks to compile written submissions into a technical report.[xvi] This allowed for no primary research, surveying or verification of submissions. In Kenya, after over eight months of wrangling within the NGC that delayed the research programme, time pressure forced researchers to be sequestered in a subterranean hotel conference room (dubbed 'the bunker') for weeks to complete the CSAR, foregoing the production of reports by each think tank.[xvii] And Mozambican officials became frustrated at the end of 2008, having rushed to complete the CSAR, only to have the review mission delayed for months due to uncertainty about the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons.[xviii]

Resource constraints. Compiling a technical report responding to just one of the four thematic areas of the questionnaire that runs to several hundred pages is a formidable task. If the research process also involves the four-pronged methods of desk research, expert surveys, opinion surveys and focus group discussions, the costs for these instruments mount up, and research institutes may need to hire additional staff. Early countries have notoriously assigned an arbitrary (and inadequate) envelope, without calculating the real costs of the research activities. In South Africa, prospective TRIs, (known in this case as Technical Support Agencies (TSAs)) had to keep their budgets below R200,000 (approximately US$28,000 in 2006) to conform to procurement regulations, although several made the case for additional funds. The four Ghanaian and Kenyan TRIs reportedly each earned between US$60,000 and US$80,000, a figure they considered inadequate for the volume and duration of the work.

Balancing research and consultation. A CSAR is not a document to be just written by experts, and the peer review rules state that the population of a country must be consulted and involved at all stages of the process. But how is this mix of research and consultation best achieved and balanced? Some research methods – particularly national opinion surveys – attempt to give every inhabitant an equal chance of being interviewed, but in practical terms, only a few thousand citizens will be part of the polling. Large public meetings where stakeholders gather and voice their views are standard, and a valuable, visible demonstration that the peer review process is happening. However, they seldom allow enough time to cover the scores of subjects, reach much depth, or carry much weight compared to desk research or structured surveys. In this regard, the participatory evidence-gathering methods described by Robert Chalmers of the University of Sussex's Institute for Development Studies, may hold potential for bridging this gap, and should be seriously considered in future reviews.

Managing relations. In most cases, TRIs have been service providers, outside of the NGC (with the notable exception of their *ex-officio* status on Kenya's governing council), hired for a specific purpose and a limited time period. They have sometimes struggled to get access to the NGC (which may itself have a fraught relationship with government, as in Kenya, initially). In the most extreme cases like South Africa, they had to execute a flawed research process that they had no say in designing, and faced fierce resistance from government when they recommended alterations. In Lesotho, when the TRIs appeared better informed about the process than the NGC, questions were asked about whether 'the tail was wagging the dog.'

The NGC and ultimately the government submit the final CSAR, based on lengthy, detailed technical reports undertaken by the TRIs. but in the editing process to combine four reports into one, they are considerably summarised and citations are often removed. There may be action by the NGC or government to soften or excise criticism. This stage has the potential to undermine and compromise the quality and integrity of the research, exacerbated if there is mistrust in a politically charged process. This suggests the need for researchers and NGCs to work together more closely, set clear ground rules and communicate openly throughout the process.

Professional integrity. Aside from technical knowledge, TRIs also potentially add credibility and objectivity. But they must be wary of their names and reputations being abused to legitimise reports that have been fundamentally edited after the researchers have completed their work. Most sign confidentiality clauses in their contracts, but there should also be clear legal recourse if they feel that their work – and hence the CSAR itself – may be compromised. As technical experts, researchers will have their own views on governance questions. They must strive to maintain objectivity and present an accurate picture, reflecting both public opinion and technical accuracy. The line between analyst and activist can be blurred and engender conflict. For example in South Africa, TRIs were accused of pushing partisan concerns rather than reflecting the content of the submissions. These conflicts could mushroom in politically charged circumstances, for example around elections.

In addition, some like the Institute for Development Studies in Kenya feel that researchers did not receive sufficient recognition for the hard work undertaken and the results produced under pressure, beyond a cursory acknowledgement in the Country Review Report. They also felt that the depth and breadth of their involvement far exceeded their contractual obligations.

Access to information. All TRIs have struggled to get information, especially from government. Ghana appointed APRM 'focal persons' in each government ministry, department and agency intended to facilitate the passing of information to the TRIs, but they still faced problems in this regard. While most constitutions promote freedom of and access to information, few have specific laws. In those that do, actually accessing information is cumbersome and time-consuming. Whether it is detail on government policies and programmes; economic or social statistics; or verifying which standards and codes the country has signed, ratified, domesticated and implemented; TRIs have faced uphill battles from intransigent or ill-informed officials, or poor information management systems. Time constraints have also hampered data collection. CRRs all highlight the poor state of national record keeping on the continent.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CULTIVATING SYNERGY AND PARTNERSHIPS

Learn from TRIs. The obvious opportunities for peer learning are from the TRIs themselves. They have experience of national APRM processes, but too few opportunities to develop and share their knowledge with others. Many have modified the questionnaire for survey purposes, but upcoming researchers have been left to reinvent the wheel rather than benefiting from their expertise and experience, as well as these important research instruments. The central APRM authorities – namely the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons and the APRM Secretariat – have not as yet concentrated much attention on tapping this resource, or delving into their experiences. When APRM stakeholders from different countries and regions are convened, it is frequently Focal Points (political liaison officials) or heads of National Governing Councils who attend, with perhaps one or two TRIs as resource persons. The initiative has been left to independent organisations like SAIIA, which has made contact with many of these think tanks, interviewed them as part of its research and commissioned reflective papers.[xix] Where national capacity needs to be built, other African think tanks are best placed to provide support.

Revise rules and instruments. The process begun in Algiers in November 2007 to revise the questionnaire and APRM processes must be accelerated and prioritised. The 6-9 month CSAR timeframe, for instance, has proven impractical and unattainable, and documents should be amended. The questionnaire needs to be streamlined and amended. SAIIA is working on developing generic APRM expert and opinion survey templates that each country could adapt, in conjunction with Professor Bob Mattes of Afrobarometer. TRIs should be consulted and form a working group to tackle these issues.

Leverage African expertise. The idea of a researchers working group could be expanded beyond questionnaire and rules revision, to provide ongoing support to upcoming countries. All TRIs should be encouraged to carefully document and publish their experiences, especially to enhance institutional memory as TRIs face attrition and researcher burn-out. Other academics could be included: statistics departments that work on surveys; and think tanks who have been studying and analysing the APRM process and could make valuable contributions, such as SAIIA, AfriMAP, TrustAfrica and Partnership Africa Canada. It is particularly important to involve francophone and lusophone researchers as well. Finally, UNECA is mandated to develop capacity on the continent, including in governance analysis. It has emerged as a potential champion for initiatives to strengthen APRM think tank interaction, cooperation and learning Its APRM Support Unit could perform the crucial function of convening TRIs regularly to share experiences and refine the governance research process (convened and initial workshop on this subject in Addis Ababa in February 2009). Ghana has mooted the idea of an APRM 'Centre of Excellence' in Accra.

Build trust. All participants, including governments and research institutes must work at their relationship, in order to build trust, minimise misunderstanding, and provide a context where objective, robust research can be undertaken and its results respected. Otherwise the exercise may just go through the motions rather than develop innovative solutions to critical problems. The procedure for selecting think tanks should be transparent and open, to give the public confidence in the integrity of the process, the report itself and its outcomes.

Provide better training. APRM authorities should develop a researchers' manual and training courses, in collaboration with previous TRIs and other researchers, for all upcoming countries. This would assist NGCs in selecting the appropriate TRIs, laying out the obligations and expectations, and ensuring the conditions for credibility that are so crucial for peer review to work. It would also help to standardise methodology and assist researchers in combining a variety of research methods. There should be accurate guidelines on the sequencing of research, how long each stage should take, and which processes could occur simultaneously, indicative costs, as well as advice on how to navigate the politics in this process. SAIIA's guidebook for APRM researchers by George Katito could be updated and developed into this sort of tool. [xx]

Advocate for access. There is a growing movement in African countries to develop and implement legislation that facilitates access to information. TRIs and associated bodies should lend their support to these campaigns, as they will allow Africa to produce better APRM reports. Stronger linkages could be forged.

Plan and budget better. History has shown that APRM research is more complex and costly than initially believed. Countries should raise funds from the fiscus or development partners early, and build a bottom-up based on activities to determine what the process will cost. Solid research in small countries like Lesotho does not cost appreciably less than in Uganda or Benin.

Focus on solutions. Compared to the CSAR, too little time and attention is devoted to the Programme of Action meant to remedy governance shortcomings. This should be prioritised, particularly to analyse why previous reform efforts failed and faltered.

CONCLUSION

When all of the above constraints and challenges are considered and weighted against the outcome, one may want to commend the involvement of research institutions in the process of creating governance evidence to support the APRM process. Despite the constraints of the questionnaire and the political context, the six Country Review Reports (CRRs) publicly available (from Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa and Benin) are solid, candid and thorough analyses of governance strengths and weaknesses in these countries.[xxi] The CRRs compile a vast amount of information; outline the context and historical background; describe the governance problem in each instance, provide evidence for the problem through statistics, testimony or other reliable sources; and then in the Programme of Action suggest remedies (although the POA is often rushed and poorly conceived). They have played an invaluable role in mobilising and involving other researchers and civil society organisations to participate in the process; through attending meetings and workshops, writing submissions and monitoring implementation. TRIs have also frequently assisted with publicity and popularising the APRM. TRIs are responsible in large measure for the quality of the Country Review Reports, based on their work as well as background research by the APRM Secretariat and the findings of the Country Review Mission.

Annex 1: Technical Research Institutes in selected national APRM processes

Country	Research body title	Democracy & political governance	Economic governance & management	Corporate governance	Socio-economic development
Ghana	Technical Research Teams (TRTs)	The Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)	The Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA)	The Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF)	The Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER)
Kenya (a)	Lead Technical Agencies (LTAs)	The African Centre for Economic Growth (ACEG)	The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)*	The Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG)	The Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi
Rwanda (b)	Technical Research Institutes (TRIs)				
Algeria (c)	Technical Research Institutes (TRIs)	National Economic and Social Council (CNES)	National Economic and Social Council (CNES)	National Economic and Social Council (CNES)	National Economic and Social Council (CNES)
South Africa	Technical Support Agencies (TSAs)	The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)	The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)	The African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (AICC)	The Institute for Economic Research on Innovation (IERI), Tshwane University of Technology
Benin	Technical Research Institutes (TRIs)	Details not listed in Country Review Report	Details not listed in Country Review Report	Details not listed in Country Review Report	Details not listed in Country Review Report
Nigeria (d)	Lead research organisations (LROs)	The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja	The African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE), Enugu	Research International Market Trends (RIMT), Lagos	Research Marketing Services (RMS), Lagos
Ugand (e)	Technical Partner Institutions (TPIs)	Mentor Consult Limited	Greenstar International Uganda Ltd.	UMACIS Consulting	REEV Consult Ltd
Lesotho (f)	Technical Research Institutes (TRIs)				

	Notes for table
a	KIPPRA is a quasi-governmental research institution.
b	Rwanda did not assign the various sections of the SAQ to local research institutes, claiming lack of capacity. Instead, various multi-disciplinary teams of government and civil society 'experts' formulated an initial draft of each section, which was then sent to the South Africa-based Africa Institute for Policy Analysis and Economic Integration (AIPA) for 'quality control'.
c	In Algeria, the research for all sections was undertaken by the government-funded National Economic and Social Council (CNES), which subcontracted other experts. These included the National Institute for Global Studies (INESG); the National Centre for Studies and Planning Analysis (CENEAP); the Research Centre for Applied Economics (CREAD) and the National Bureau of Statistics (ONS), as well as universities from Algiers, Tlemcen, Oran, Constantine and Annaba.
d	In Nigeria, 10 institutes in different states around the country were initially selected to undertake the research. After protracted contractual disputes, they were replaced by the four institutions noted above, plus the National Bureau of Statistics.[xxii]
e	Uganda initially contracted four lead TPIs and eight specialist TPIs for desk research. Due to the complexities of coordination, they were replaced by the four mentioned in this table. Note that these are consultancies rather than think tanks.
f	In Lesotho, due to the small size of the country and lack of think tanks, a consortium composed of the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Lesotho (NUL) and the government-funded Lesotho Institute of Public Administration and Management (LIPAM),contracted out the work in thematic clusters among themselves and to other researchers and university departments.

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[ii] Research institutions are not mentioned, for example in the July 2008 protocol establishing the APRM, and the November 2003 guidelines to APRM countries only mention research in relation to background work by the continental APRM Secretariat and for the Country Review Mission.

[iii] APRM Secretariat, *Supplementary Document to APRM Guidelines for Country Review – The APRM National Structures*, (undated, presumed 2007), pp. 2-3.

[iv] Jones N *et al*, 'Evidence-based policy in post-conflict context: assessing improvements in governance' synthesis paper, Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) Group, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), draft scoping study for UNDP Oslo Governance Centre Workshop, Cairo, January 2008, pp. 9-11.

[v] Telephone interview with F Appiah, Accra, 28 July 2006, quoted in Herbert R and Gruzd S, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers*, SAIIA, 2008, pp. 163-4.

[vi] Telephone interview with SKB Asante, Accra, 28 July 2006, quoted in *ibid*. p. 164.

[vii] *Ibid.,* p. 164.

[viii] APR Panel of Eminent Persons, 'African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana', Midrand, South Africa, June 2005, p.xii.

[ix] SAIIA email questionnaire interview with M Kinuthia, 17 July 2006.

[x] For example, the democracy and political governance section covers subjects from electoral systems and electoral practice, the separation of powers, human rights, conflict prevention and management and corruption, while the economic governance and management thematic area spans subjects like trade, regional integration, economic policy-making, fiscal management, oversight and monetary policy. TRIs in both Kenya and Ghana subcontracted other experts for certain sections of their CSARs.

[xi] SAIIA email questionnaire interview with Dr P Quartey, 9 July 2006.

[xii] SAIIA email questionnaire interview with Dr W Masai, 7 July 2006.

[xiii] See Herbert & Gruzd, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-313, especially pp. 261-264 and pp. 289-299.

[xiv] See http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/SA_APRM_Overview.pdf for a summary and http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/SA-APRM_Comparison.pdf for SAIIA's full comparison of changes between the earlier and later versions of the CSAR.

[xv] See O Ibeanu, 'Payment and independence: Does a client relationship with government inhibit "think tank" criticism?', SAIIA Occasional Paper No 15, November 2008.

[xvi] See Herbert & Gruzd, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-293.

[xvii] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

[xviii] Interview with A Patel, heads of the Mozambican APRM Technical Unit, Johannesburg, 19 November 2008.

[xix] See for example O Ibeanu, *op. cit.,* and M Jama, R Atieno and J Onjala, 'Does APRM work benefit think tanks? The case of Kenya', SAIIA Occasional Paper No 16, November 2008. These papers can be found online at http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=788:saiia-occasional-papers&catid=21:e-publications&Itemid=142

[xx] G Katito, 'Understanding APRM Research: Planning, Process and Politics. A Practical Handbook for Peer Review Research', SAIIA Occasional Paper No 4, July 2008.
[xxi] Available on the APRM website http://www.aprm-international.org
[xxii] See LA Jinadu, *The African Peer Review Process in Nigeria*, The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) and AfriMAP, July 2008, pp. 13-16.